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ABSTRACT 
Language is often linked with identity. In fact, language is sometimes such a 
powerful force that it can transcend or replace the resilient forces of ethnic or cultural 
identity. However, just as language has such an impressive ability to transcend ethnic and 
cultural barriers to unite disparate peoples, it has the equal ability to stir powerful 
nationalistic, ethnic, and cultural passions in groups of people who feel their language is 
under attack. This is precisely because language is more than just a tool for 
communication; it is a basic element of group identity. It is within this framework that 
this thesis examines the language policies of the former Soviet Union and its successor 
state, the Russian Federation.  The thesis concludes that the language policy coming out 
of the Kremlin today is simply a continuation of the Soviet policy of using language as 
tool to homogenize those who are near the seat of power and exert pressure and influence 
in places that are removed from it. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Language is often linked with identity. In fact, language is sometimes such a 
powerful force that it can transcend or replace the resilient forces of ethnic or cultural 
identity. However, just as language has such an impressive ability to transcend ethnic and 
cultural barriers to unite disparate peoples, it has the equal ability to stir powerful 
nationalistic, ethnic, and cultural passions in groups of people who feel their language is 
under attack. This is precisely because language is more than just a tool for 
communication; it is a basic element of group identity. It is within this framework that 
this thesis aims to examine the language policies of the former Soviet Union and its 
successor state, the Russian Federation. Before taking the issue of language and identity 
head on, however, this thesis will present a brief discussion of what “Russian Identity” 
means in general. 
From the outset of the Soviet Union to its collapse, Soviet leaders struggled to 
balance the implementation of a lingua franca that could help strengthen ties between the 
individual republics with the ability and opportunity for each individual republic to 
maintain its own cultural and ethnic identity. Language policy continues to be of concern 
in current-day Russia; however, the issue has taken on dimensions different from those 
during Soviet times. This thesis will devote some analysis to why particular language 
policies were chosen in the Soviet Union, but that analysis must be viewed with an 
understanding of the difficult circumstances under which it is considered; as one 
researcher states on this subject, “One cannot assume that any [proposed or legislated] 
policy was actually implemented, any more than one can assume that the purported 
motivation behind a given piece of legislation was genuine,” given the opacity with 
which the Soviet Regime conducted itself.1 The analysis devoted to the policies of the 
Russian Federation will be somewhat speculative as well, as the research for this thesis 
has revealed little in the way of policy justifications. Finally, this work will consider what 
 
 
1 Lenore A. Grenoble, Language Policy in the Soviet Union (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2003), vii. 
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effects these policies had on many of the Soviet Republics and continue to have in the 
Russian Federation by following language policy development from the inception of the 
Soviet Union, through its collapse, to the present. 
The Soviet Union and its successor state, the Russian Federation, offer substantial 
insight into the interplay between language and identity. They, like many other nations, 
have struggled with integrating a multiethnic state under a single, unified banner. Neither 
the Soviet Union nor the Russian Federation has provided a complete solution to the 
problem, perhaps because there is none. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders may have been 
on the right track, at least in part. They attempted to unite all of the disparate peoples 
under the umbrella of an idea that was not based on ethnic derivation—they chose the 
ideology of Marxism/Communism as their unifier. Their ultimate failure, however, was 
two-fold. First, the idea they chose was fundamentally flawed; Marxism and Communism 
have never worked as successful long-term economic or political models. And second, 
the Soviet leaders eventually began actively (and sometimes aggressively) to encourage, 
or in some cases even coerce, the peoples of the Soviet Union to meld their own unique 
national identities, hollow though they might have been, with a primarily Russian idea of 
the proper Soviet citizen, as opposed to persuading them to come willingly.2 
Some leaders of the Russian Federation have moved closer to a successful 
solution in this regard. They have attempted to present the Russian Federation to its 
populace as a civic idea, not an ethnic one—even though there are still some fairly 
nationalistic trappings connected with its language policies. If governmental leaders are 
successful in transforming Russia into a truly civic entity, then perhaps they will be able 
to reach a point where the ethnic minorities in Russia no longer pose a threat to stability, 
because they will be convinced that Russia is, in reality, for all rossiianne (Russian 
citizens) and not just russkie (ethnic Russians). 
 
2 See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Minority Nationalism Today: an Overview,” in Robert Conquest, 
ed., The Last Empire (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 235–253, and John D. Dunlop, 
“Language, Culture, Religion and National Awareness,” in Robert Conquest, ed., The Last Empire 
(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 265–289. 
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II. THE ESSENCE OF RUSSIANNESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Anyone conversant with the long and tumultuous history of Russia, where 
“Russia” comprises anything from Kievan Rus’ to the current Russian Federation, can 
attest that the nation regularly referred to as Russia has continually struggled to define 
itself and where it fits in relation to the other nations of the world. This struggle has 
always existed and continues in Russia to this day. Throughout history, Russian 
politicians, poets, and even some peasants have asked themselves: Are Russia’s cultural, 
social, and religious ties closer to the West or the East?  Is Russia—or should Russia 
aspire to be considered—a Western nation?  Is Russia, in reality, a Eurasian nation, 
unique and separate from any in the East or the West?  If these questions can be answered 
at all, they are impossible to answer until one first answers a more fundamental question:  
What is a Russian?  This chapter endeavors to discuss the elements that make up the 
“Russian” identity and the reasons that Russia has, for much of its history, been restless 
about its place in the world. 
B. THE TROUBLE WITH IDENTITY 
Before tackling identity in the Russian context, a few notes about notes about 
identity in general must be made. While the concept of identity per se is not new, national 
identity as connected to the nation-state is a fairly modern concept, with its genesis in 
Europe. Not until the Peace of Westphalia was the idea of the nation-state formalized and 
codified; before that time, the idea of a sovereign state did not exist in the way it is 
understood today. Nevertheless, the literature on the social identity shows “that most 
people have a deep need to belong to groups.”3 Accordingly, before the Peace of 
Westphalia, the peoples of Europe organized themselves along cultural, linguistic, and 
religious lines that had no clearly fixed boundaries. When the concept of state 
sovereignty was introduced, the peoples of Europe were expected, even required, to 
 
3 Jeff Spinner-Halev and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, “National Identity and Self-Esteem,” Perspectives 
on Politics 1 (2003): 523. 
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change their group allegiances from cultural (or linguistic or religious) to political. Of 
course, changing such allegiances was easier said than done; nevertheless the seeds of 
national identity and nationalism as the primary drivers of social identity were planted 
and given room to grow. 
Prior to the Peace of Westphalia, nationalistic allegiances did not exist because 
the idea of a nation as a political entity had not yet been introduced to the psyches and 
lexicons of the peoples of Europe. Several hundred years later, however, “nation-ness is 
the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time.”4 Scholars 
acknowledge there are several competing theories regarding the reasons for the nation or 
“nation-ness” becoming “a dominant political category in many…parts of the world”; 
nevertheless, they generally agree that “despite the different ways of explaining the rise 
of the nation…nationalism as a political force has become powerful in the modern era.”5 
The challenge comes in defining the elements of identity of any particular group 
within a nation-state, or the collective identity of a nation, because “nation, nationality, 
nationalism—all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone analyze.”6 Jeffry 
Duncan agrees with this sentiment: “Identity is a notoriously difficult concept, linked to 
culture and history as much as to social psychology and politics.”7 Spinner-Halev and 
Theiss-Morse add, “A precise definition of nation is hard to pin down, partly because the 
distinctions between nation, ethnic group, and state are often opaque.”8 Determining and 
defining Russian identity is no exception; nevertheless, the remainder of this chapter will 
be devoted to expounding its elements. 
 
4 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1991), 3. 
5 Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse, “National Identity,” 516. 
6 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 3. 
7 Peter J. S. Duncan, “Contemporary Russian Identity Between East and West,” The Historical Journal 
48 (2005): 277–278. 
8 Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse, “National Identity,” 516 (italics in the original). 
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C. WHAT IS A RUSSIAN? 
Daniel Rancour-Laferriere titles Chapter 13 of his book on Russian nationalism 
as, “Are Russians a Biological Unity?”  He immediately answers in the negative and 
states, “There is no known way to identify “the Russians” anatomically, physiologically, 
or genetically. This is so if only because the biological heritage of Russians is extremely 
diverse.”  He continues the point by saying: 
It is a commonplace of Russian historical thinking to observe that 
Russians descend not only from Russians, but also from such 
heterogeneous groups as Finns, Ukrainians, Tatars, Mongols, Germans, 
Swedes, etc. Even in the heart of European Russia, in the area around 
Moscow and the upper Volga, the local Russians are described by 
ethnographers as having a decidedly mixed ancestry.9 
In other words, a “Russian” is a psychological, social, or cultural construct, not a 
biological one. In reality, those calling themselves Russian (russkii as opposed to 
rossiiskii) are no more “ethnically” Russian than those calling themselves American are 
ethnically American. Certainly, there are those who define themselves as Native 
Americans, but even the people in these groups willingly divide themselves into 
“nations” as diverse as the peoples of Europe. Just as it is in the United States, where 
being an American means ascribing to an idea, as opposed to clinging to a particular 
ethnic background, so, too, it is in Russia, despite protestations to the contrary. 
D. THE ELEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN IDENTITY 
Although identity is a particularly difficult concept to quantify and define, there 
are some characteristics that have led to or influenced what might be called the current-
day Russian identity. In the following analysis, the origins of these influences will be 
broken down into four major periods: From Antiquity to the Empire, the Russian Empire, 
the Soviet Union, and the Post-Soviet Era or the Russian Federation. 
 
 
9 Daniel Rancour-Laferriere, Russian Nationalism From an Interdisciplinary Perspective: Imagining 
Russia (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), 89. 
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1. From Antiquity to the Empire 
As if by design to complicate the search for Russian identity, or perhaps to 
underscore that it truly is a psychological and not a physical or biological construct, little 
is known about the true origins of the Slavs. From the earliest known history of the Slavs, 
their story is one of outside domination and conquest. During the eighth and ninth 
centuries of the Common Era, “many East Slavic tribes paid tribute to the Khazars, a 
Turkic-speaking people who adopted Judaism about A.D. 740 and lived in the southern 
Volga and Caucasus regions.”10 Also, by the ninth century, Scandinavian warriors and 
merchants, known as Varangians, had established themselves at Novgorod and began 
moving south to extend their authority to Kiev. The Varangians were able to expel the 
Khazars, establish a commercial treaty with the Byzantine Empire, and establish control 
over the trade routes from the Black Sea to the Baltic. Because of the lack of a reliable 
historical record, “historians have debated the role of the Varangians in the establishment 
of Kievan Rus'. Most Russian historians—especially in the Soviet era—have stressed the 
Slavic influence in the development of the state. Although Slavic tribes had formed their 
own regional jurisdictions by 860, the Varangians accelerated the crystallization of 
Kievan Rus' ”.11 Regardless, the Varangians and their decedents, known as the Rurik 
dynasty, ruled Kievan Rus' and the surrounding areas until 1598. 
In 988, Prince Vladimir Christianized Kievan Rus'; however, Vladimir accepted 
Orthodoxy as opposed to Catholicism, placing Kievan Rus' and its successor states 
forever outside the sway of the Holy Roman Empire and many of the Western ideas that 
developed as a result of Rome’s influence in the West. In addition, the Orthodoxy 
accepted by Vladimir and Kievan Rus' quickly evolved into something different and 
distinct from the Orthodoxy of Byzantium. Eventually, Russian Christians came to see 
themselves as the protectors of Christianity. They felt that both Constantinople and Rome 
had strayed from the true meaning and purpose of Christianity. It is interesting to note, 
that even in modern Russian, when the word “Christianity” (khristianstvo) is used, it 
 




often carries the meaning “Russian Orthodox” not “Christian” in the catholic sense. In 
fact, in the 1400s with the waning and fall of the Byzantine Empire, Russia began to see 
itself as the last bastion of the faith, even proclaiming Moscow as the “Third Rome.”  
Furthermore, believers of the Russian version of Orthodoxy saw (and still see) suffering 
as a means to come closer to Christ. Only through suffering can one truly experience the 
divine. This idea stands in stark contrast to the Western understanding of Christianity, 
where Christ is seen as one who has suffered for mankind so that mankind itself does not 
have to suffer. This idea of suffering permeates much of Russia culture even outside of 
religious contexts. In fact, some observers of Russia would argue that Russians are not 
happy unless they are suffering. 
Even though the ruling princes in Kievan Rus', Muscovy, and Novgorod were 
Orthodox Christians and intermarried with both Byzantine and European families, they 
were also significantly influenced by the conquests of the Mongol Golden Horde. From 
about 1220 to approximately 1480, Kievan Rus' continued under the domination of the 
Mongols from the east. While Novgorod was never occupied, it did pay tribute to the 
Golden Horde and was influenced by contact with the easterners—all while having to 
contend with Western incursions form German and Polish invaders. Furthermore, at the 
beginning of the Mongol occupation, Muscovy (later Moscow) was a small trading 
outpost. The Mongol domination of other parts of Rus' and Novgorod allowed Moscow 
to become powerful enough to eventually throw off the Mongol yoke and seize control of 
the lands around it, including Novgorod and Tver', paving the way for Ivan IV to be the 
first ruler formally crowned as “Tsar of all Russia” in 1547. 
Although this history of Rus' before the advent of the Russian Empire has been 
quite brief, there are some important points to be made within the context of 
understanding Russian identity. First, a significant portion of this period in history is 
characterized by outside domination and conquest from peoples on all sides.  Second, that 
domination also brought with it lasting cultural influences, especially from the East; and 
finally, the yoke of bondage was eventually thrown off without external help, 
demonstrating to Russians that they must rely on themselves and cannot depend on 
anyone else. 
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2. The Russian Empire 
The history of the Russian Empire is rich and exciting; however, it will only be 
touched on here to bring out those elements that have had the most significant effect on 
shaping Russian identity, beginning with the reign of Peter the Great at the end of the 
seventeenth century. Until Peter became Tsar, Russia was somewhat isolated from the 
West and was certainly lagging behind most Western countries in terms of technology 
and modernization. Peter was greatly enamored of the West from the time in his youth, 
when he would go to the outskirts of Moscow to visit the ordered areas of the foreign 
artisans there. He felt that much of Russia was backward and inferior to what the West 
had to offer. As Tsar, he made every effort to bring both Western social customs and 
Western technological advancements to Russia. He even founded his namesake city with 
the intention that it be a “Window to the West.”  Furthermore, Peter continued the 
Russian tradition of using the Church as to tool to legitimize his political goals. He 
transformed it into “a servant of the state” by making it a just “another branch of Russia’s 
civil government.”12 
By importing Western ideas and subjugating the Church to the state, Peter the 
Great presided over a secular revolution that struck Old Russia with full force, moving it 
from a nation that “had faced south and east toward Byzantium into a nation and a culture 
that looked firmly westward to Europe.”13 Peter’s reforms changed “how men and 
women behaved in public and private, how they spent their leisure hours, and even what 
they ate and how they dressed.”14 Peter’s reforms also set the stage for the conflict that 
continues to animate discussions of Russian identity today—that of Slavophile versus 
Westernizer. 
The secular revolution that flourished under Peter the Great continued for some 
time after his death and left an indelible mark; it touched all areas of Russian culture and 
civilization—even language was not immune. Until the mid-nineteenth century, French 
 
12 W. Bruce Lincoln, Between Heaven and Hell: The Story of a Thousand Years of Artistic Life in 
Russia (New York: Viking, 1998), 62. 
13 Lincoln, Between Heaven and Hell, 53. 
14 Ibid. 
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and German were spoken more often in the parlors of aristocrats and royalty than was 
Russian. In fact, not until literary greats like Lomonosov and Pushkin made Russian 
accessible and acceptable did many in the aristocracy abandon the tongues of Western 
Europe as their primary means of communication.  
The Slavophiles began to make their mark on nineteenth-century Russian as well, 
advocating a return to “traditional” Russian roots and values away from the decadence 
and debauchery of the West. Geoffrey Hosking characterizes well the dichotomy between 
the opposing viewpoints. He states: 
The crucial difference between Slavophiles and Westerners was over the 
question whether, in borrowing from European culture, Russia was 
denying its own nature, as the Slavophiles believed, or on the contrary 
taking vital steps for its own renewal and development.15 
Russians have never resolved the conflict between these two incompatible ideas, 
and the concepts have continued to clash with one another through the remainder of 
Russian history to the present day. 
3. The Soviet Union 
Egalitarianism is an integral part of the Russian psyche, and Russians seem to 
have an almost inveterate drive to subjugate the needs of individual to the needs of the 
group. This idea of the primacy of the group was cultivated in the peasant mir. As 
Richard Pipes describes, “The Russian peasant [had]…a weakly developed sense of 
personal identity,” and for the peasant, the mir was both his village commune and his 
world.16 In the mir, “The community restrained the unsocial impulses of the [peasant]: 
the collective was superior to its individual members.”17 Furthermore, throughout the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, landowners had cultivated what Hosking 
characterizes as a “joint responsibility,” between themselves and the peasants tied to their 
lands to maintain order and minimize problems. This relationship “colored the peasant 
 
15 Geoffrey Hosking, Russia and the Russians: A History (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 277. 
16 In Russian, mir means both “village commune” and “the world.” 
17 Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin Books USA Inc., 1995), 
158.  
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outlook on all aspects of life: economics, work patterns, law, property and authority. Its 
principles were embodied in the village assembly, the skhod, which consisted of all the 
heads of households.”18 According to Hosking, this arrangement “generated a mentality 
which emphasized risk minimization, egalitarianism, and dependence on patronage.”19 
Even though the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Soviet regime was, as Martin Malia 
points out, “fundamentally and aggressively antipeasant,” Soviet leaders were able to use 
the social structure that existed in the mir to their advantage because it was tailor-made 
for communism.20 
In addition to retaining the familiar decision structure of the mir, Soviet Party 
leaders retained a familiar means of controlling the movement of its citizens. In the mir, 
peasants were prohibited from leaving without an internal passport issued by the head of 
their household. The Soviets used regulations that echoed this idea, “where kolkhoz 
members [were] not issued regular passports and [could not] move away without 
authorization.”21 
Trappings from the mir were not the only ideas that carried over into the Soviet 
Union. The contest between Slavophiles and Westernizers was as robust during Soviet 
times as it is now, even if it took a different form:  “[The debate] divided Russian 
socialism between Marxists and Populists, Russian Marxists between Mensheviks and 
Bolsheviks, and Bolsheviks between opponents and followers of Stalin. The controversy 
has [always] been between those who believed in Europe and those who believed in 
Russia.”22 
When considering Russian identity and its relation to the Soviet Union, one 
cannot overemphasize the importance of World War II. Victory over Nazi Germany 
remains a crowning achievement of the former Soviet Union and served to foster a strong 
 
18 Hosking, Russia and the Russians, 255. 
19 Ibid., 226. 
20 Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: The 
Free Press, 1994), 52. 
21 Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, 164n. 
22 Yale Richmond, From Nyet to Da: Understanding the New Russia, 4th ed. (Boston: Intercultural 
Press, 2009), 54. 
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sense of national pride in its citizens. Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson encapsulate 
perfectly the roll the war played in shaping the Soviet psyche: 
Indeed, from 1945 to through the mid-1980s, World War II (which 
Russians call the Great Patriotic War) was perhaps the single most 
powerful element in the constitutive national narrative of the USSR. In 
short, the memorials to this war were among the most potent sites for the 
construction of a Soviet national identity.23  
Even today, if you engage someone with ties to the former Red Army (or to the 
current Russian Federation military, for that matter) to argue that it was the United States 
and not the Soviet Union that won World War II, the discussion might very well become 
quite heated. Even suggesting that the Soviet Army did not defeat the Nazis without 
assistance form other nations could turn a pleasant discussion into a vehement 
argument.24 
4. The Post-Soviet Era or the Russian Federation 
In the Post-Soviet era, Russian national identity has taken on a slightly different 
form. Initially, the historical contest between Slavophiles and Westernizers evolved into a 
debate between Eurasianists and Westernizers. The Westernizers’ position changed little 
from the past: Russia is a backward nation (even though it possesses nuclear weapons) 
that would thoroughly benefit from democracy and a free-market economy in addition to 
the Western ideas and values of enlightenment, rationalism, rule of law, etc. The 
Eurasianists’ position, on the other hand, is summed up well by Dmitri Trenin: “To 
proponents of [neo-Eurasianism], Russia stood as a unique bridge state, spanning the 
huge continent and naturally mediating between the East and the West, North and 
South.”25 However, Trenin argues that the Eurasian idea is defunct and that Russia is 
 
23 Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson, “Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era Monuments 
and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 92 
(2002): 524 
24 As happened to me when I got into just such a discussion with a lieutenant in the United States 
Navy who is now a U.S. citizen, but had previously served as a conscript in the Soviet military before 
emigrating to the United States with his parents.  Not only had he served, but his father and grandfather had 
served proudly as officers in the Soviet military as well.  
25 Dmitri V. Trenin, Getting Russia Right (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2007), 73. 
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once again a standalone power that “resists assimilation and absorption into the West and 
abhors foreign domination.”  He continues, “It wants equality with the world’s premier 
powers. It seeks a friendly neighborhood in which it feels comfortable.”26 In other words, 
Russia intends to stand on its own two feet and make its own way in the world—
regardless of what other nations think its path should be.  
Despite the tension between those who would look outside of Russia to find its 
path and those who would look inward, there is one particular facet of Russian identity 
that has been a constant throughout history and has become quite prevalent in the recent 
past. As Anne Clunan writes, “Post-Soviet Russian political elites were clearly split over 
what Russia’s national identity should be in the aftermath of collapse of the Soviet 
Union. They evinced little agreement on Russia’s political purpose or sources of national 
self-esteem beyond great power status.”27  That is to say, regardless of their stance on 
Russia’s national identity, the political elites all wanted one thing in common—respect 
on the world stage commensurate with the position the Russian Empire and the Soviet 
Union had held in the past. 
E. CONCLUSION 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, delineating and describing national or 
social identity is a tricky subject. In the case of Russia, it is exceptionally difficult, as 
demonstrated by the cursory treatment of Russian history. There are, however, some 
things of which we can be sure. First, Russia is as much an idea as it is a nation. Second, 
Russia is a diverse entity that does not fit neatly into either an Eastern or Western 
construct. Finally, respect is paramount to those who attempt to define Russia’s national 
identity today. The following chapter addresses many of the aspects of identity outlined 
in this one, but does so in the context of examining Soviet language and related policy 
choices from the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
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III. FROM THE BOLSHEVIKS TO PERESTROIKA 
A. BEFORE THE BOLSHEVIKS 
In order to understand the genesis of Soviet language policy and Lenin’s stance 
on the languages and peoples of the newly created Soviet Union, it is necessary to 
understand the status of languages in the Russian Empire before the Bolshevik 
Revolution. For some time in the Russian Empire, Russian was of no particular 
significance to the aristocracy, especially in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. In fact, during 
the early nineteenth century, some members of the Russian aristocracy held French in 
higher regard than Russian, and most likely spoke it better as well. It is interesting to note 
that even in the novels of Leo Tolstoy, when one of his characters from the aristocracy 
speaks French, Tolstoy writes the dialogue in French as opposed to Russian (Tolstoy 
wanted to be true to the time period he was depicting). In was not until the second half of 
the nineteenth century, near the end of the Romanov dynasty, that Russian truly became 
the official language of the empire—with a few exceptions, such as in the Baltic regions, 
Poland, and Finland. 
During the latter portion of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth, however, “Russian was the official language for almost the whole Russian 
Empire,” and “languages other than Russian had no rights whatsoever.”28 With the 
absolute authority of the Tsar waning, Russification began to play a more prominent role 
and the government began efforts to “Russify” or make culturally Russian as much of the 
empire as possible in an attempt to gain back some of the influence and authority that the 
Tsar had lost. Russification, of course, also included attempts to make those who were 
not “ethnically” Russian learn and speak Russian as well. These practices were not well 
received in vast areas of the empire, and an anti-Russian attitude was prevalent in large 
portions of the empire at the time Lenin rose to power. 
 
28 Bernard Comrie, The Languages of the Soviet Union (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), 21. 
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B. LENIN, LANGUAGE, AND PEOPLES 
Throughout its history, the Soviet Union was a multilingual and a multiethnic 
entity. The 1989 Soviet census reported over 100 ethnic groups, each to a greater or 
lesser degree speaking its own language and celebrating its own cultural heritage. These 
numbers are also reflective of how the Soviet Union looked in 1918. Many linguists 
believe, in fact, that there were perhaps as many as 200 languages spoken at the time of 
the Bolshevik Revolution. Nevertheless, the number of ethic groups and languages did 
not concern Lenin, per se, because he saw Marxist ideology as the unifying element for 
the nascent Communist movement. Lenin believed, as Marx preached, that Communism 
would transcend national and ethnic identities and that all nations would eventually come 
together as a global proletariat. Nationalism was only useful for Lenin when he could use 
it “to advance the proletarian cause.”29 
In his understanding of nationalism, Lenin saw the destructive potential of 
Russian chauvinism (read Russian nationalism) regarding his plans for a supranational or 
perhaps an “anational” Communist state. For this reason he took great care to ensure that 
all languages spoken in the Soviet Union received equal status. In fact, “Lenin believed 
that no single language should be given the status of a state language; rather, he promoted 
national equality and self-determinism.”30 Lenin purported to believe that each of the 
languages of the peoples of the Soviet Union was inviolable. This idea was even 
enshrined in the 1936 Soviet Constitution after his death. The Constitution guaranteed the 
right to all Soviet citizens the use of—and instruction in—their native tongue. 
However, the multinational nature of the Soviet Union still posed a significant 
two-pronged obstacle for Lenin and the other Soviet leaders as they set out on their path 
to the Marxist utopia in which they so strongly believed. The Soviet Union was 
extensively multilingual, and much of the population was uneducated and illiterate. In 
order to indoctrinate the masses in the Communist ideology, the people had to be 
educated. As Comrie states: 
 
29 Grenoble, Language Policy, 35. 
30 Ibid., 36. 
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One of the main practical problems facing the new regime was the need to 
unify the country, so all of its peoples would feel part of the new 
development, contributing to it and drawing benefit from it. Obviously, 
one requirement dictated by this, especially in view of the extreme 
centralization of the Soviet state, is the existence of a common language to 
facilitate communication among members of different ethnic groups, and 
the obvious choice for this language was Russian [as it was the native 
language of the largest group of Soviet citizens].31 
Despite Lenin’s pronounced dedication to the equality of languages, the Party 
leadership needed a lingua franca to accomplish its aim; in addition, the Party was 
already reluctant to cede any governmental control, including that over education, to the 
many different nationalities. 
The Russian speaking majority, which had tremendous influence on policy 
formation and resource distribution, “encouraged” native language development in the 
Republics, but did it in such a way that the languages acquired a tremendous number of 
Russian lexical items and grammatical patterns as well as Russian orthography. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that under Lenin there was a short period of time during 
which many of the Central Asian languages, spoken predominantly by Islamic peoples, 
were converted from their traditional Arabic scripts to a Latin-based orthography. Latin 
orthography was chosen in order to avoid the appearance by the Party that the changes 
were “part of a policy of linguistic, cultural, and religious Russification.”32 A movement 
even sprang up in Russia proper to convert Russian to a Latin-based alphabet as well, but 
this never gained any popular support. The Latin alphabets’ tenures were fleeting, 
though, and after Lenin’s death, many of the languages were forced in a few short years 
to move to Cyrillic orthography; the rationale given for this was to make learning Russian 
easier for those who did not speak it as a first language. 
C. THE STALIN YEARS 
As Stalin came to power, he began to promote ideas and implement policies that 
shifted emphasis away from all languages having equal status toward the idea that when 
 
31 Comrie, The Languages of the Soviet Union, 22. 
32 Ibid., 23. 
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the proletariat ruled the world, “a common language [would] begin to take shape, a 
common language which Stalin envision[ed] as an international lingua franca for 
economic, political and cultural cooperation.”  Stalin anticipated, or at least purported, 
that this common language would exist alongside the individual national languages. This 
idea fit well with his Marxist definition that a nation is not necessarily a state; rather, it is 
a “specifically stable community of people with a common territory, language, economic 
life and ‘psychological make-up.’ ”33 Stalin’s view that a nation is an entity with a 
common language and, in Soviet terms, a common ideology, but not necessarily a state, is 
particularly important as it became the foundation for many, if not most, of the policies 
enacted regarding language throughout the remaining history of the Soviet Union. In 
addition, determining which groups qualified as nations allowed the Soviet leadership to 
determine which languages held equal status with Russian as “national languages” 
entitled to legal rights and privileges. Furthermore, it created a basis for including (or 
excluding) groups when allocating language-related state resources. 
As early as 1923, after Stalin’s rise to the head of the party and even before 
Lenin’s death, the Soviet regime began what it called korennizatsiia, also known as 
“nativization” or “indigenization,” to educate the native populations in their mother 
tongues and move them into the workforce, especially the Soviet Party structures. This 
policy recognized the “national languages” as equal with Russian while creating with 
“the utmost speed, a larger and better educated labor force so as to rapidly industrialize 
the country.”34 The program encountered many problems, however. Much of the outlying 
population was illiterate and poorly educated to begin with, so they had to be taught to 
read before they could be educated in other matters. In addition, the dearth of qualified 
teachers who spoke the national languages and the absence of adequate teaching 
materials written in the mother tongues required many of the classes to be taught in 
Russian, which most of the students did not understand. 
 
 
33 Grenoble, Language Policy, 43. 
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By the late 1920s, korennizatsiia was abandoned, although not officially, in favor 
of Russification. As Grenoble states, “Soviet nationality policies were changed, and 
Russian language and culture were officially promoted as the best means to a Soviet 
society. The nativization policy was no longer valued as an absolute goal in and of itself, 
and it was greatly diminished, to be eventually phased out entirely.”35 This shift was 
made abundantly clear when Stalin addressed the XVIIth Party Congress in 1934 and 
signaled a clear break from Lenin regarding the Party’s approach to Russian chauvinism 
as the greatest threat to the health of the Soviet Union. Stalin instead professed that the 
greater danger was uncontested nationalism, in particular small-nation nationalism 
detracting from the greater goal of a united “communist nation.” 
This was the basis for Stalin’s idea of “national in form, socialist in content.” In 
other words, the national languages still enjoyed positions of primacy, at least in theory, 
but the Republics in which they were spoken needed to comport with Stalin’s view of the 
direction in which the Soviet Union should progress. It is interesting to note, however, 
that during World War II, “the leadership of the Soviet Union decided to freeze the 
compulsory introduction of Russian and let other languages alone, partly because it didn’t 
have the means to enforce Russian, but mainly because it did not wish to awaken 
opposition in the Republics.”36 Despite Stalin’s desire to make Russian the lingua franca, 
he understood that his attempts to crowd out the national languages could cause serious 
damage to the Soviet Union at a time when unity was absolutely necessary. Only after 
World War II did Stalin return to his strong push for Russian; this push continued until 
his death in 1953. 
D. KHRUSHCHEV’S VISION 
Khrushchev’s accession to the position of Party leader after Stalin’s death gave 
him the opportunity to disavow many of Stalin’s unpopular policies and to distance the 
Party form practices that many found heinous during Stalin’s reign. This distancing 
 
35 Grenoble, Language Policy, 44–45. 
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facilitated changes in the realm of language policy as much as anywhere else in the 
Soviet Union. Khrushchev and his advisors understood, as Lenin and Stalin did, that 
ethnic heterogeneity is a potential source of great instability; however, Khrushchev also 
believed that “one way out of this problem [was] to use language as a proxy for 
ethnicity.”37 Furthermore, Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership understood that 
“language [could be] a major element in the development of an ethnic community’s 
political consciousness and a tool of state-building,” but that it can also be “manipulated, 
elevated, and transformed in the interest of the state.”38 
The Soviet system was similar to many societies on a path of political 
modernization. As the masses became more educated, they wanted social mobility and 
the ability to participate politically; this meant that is was “desirable for the languages 
spoken by the masses to be congruent with those of the dominant elites.”  Making the 
languages of the masses congruent with those of the elites posed a tremendous problem 
for Soviet language planners because of the sheer number of “languages of the masses.”  
At a minimum, the number included the titular language of each one of the fifteen Soviet 
Republics. For the Party leadership, “the choice of language and the question of whether 
minority languages should be maintained or discouraged [went] beyond the matter of 
mere political integration and touched upon the legitimacy of the national culture on 
which the language system is based.”39 
Up to this point in Soviet history, all of the national languages had held at least 
notional equality with Russian; however, Khrushchev introduced a policy shift to make 
Russian the language of the Soviet Union, although not necessarily the “official” 
language. Also up to this point, there had been no concerted push for a specifically Soviet 
culture with a specifically Soviet language, although many of the previous language 
policies had, in effect, attempted to move non-Russian Soviet citizens closer to the 
Russian ideal, even if official pronouncements stated otherwise. Khrushchev had a vision 
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for his Communist utopia; he imagined a Soviet Union that was united both politically 
and linguistically. In short, he wanted to create a Soviet culture to subsume all of the 
other cultures. To accomplish his goals, Khrushchev moved to make Russian the second 
national language of all the non-Russian speaking republics. This was palatable to the 
Party because some languages had come to be viewed as less viable than others and 
therefore deserved less support and protection. In addition, in the Party’s view, the push 
for Russian would help strengthen its control over the outlying republics and encourage 
Soviet citizens to further integrate into Russian Soviet culture. 
Khrushchev’s ideas were enshrined into law with the Education Reforms of 1958-
59, which stated that education in the mother tongue was no longer compulsory and that 
Russian was a required course of study where instruction in the native language was not 
abandoned. The consequence of this, in a practical sense, was that instruction in the 
national languages suffered in favor of increased Russian instruction. More than at any 
previous time, Russian held the de facto position of “the official language of the USSR 
and [it] occupied a central position in education and government,” without being named 
as such. The reforms instituted by Khrushchev “represented an open move toward 
Russification of the country.”40 Khrushchev, who had started out distancing himself for 
Stalin’s Russo-centric policies, eventually arrived at a Stalinesque policy of 
Russification. 
E. BREZHNEV AND THE 1970s 
Brezhnev’s ideas about language were strongly influenced by his predecessors, as 
well as by the academics of the time. According to some ethnographic studies, “Soviet 
sociologists have argued that the most desirable form of acculturation occurs among 
those non-Russians who have learned Russian at an early age.”41 In Brezhnev’s view, the 
Russian language would cement, not just create, the unity of the Soviet culture and serve 
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as an “effective accelerator of the drawing together of nations.”42 Party rhetoric had 
moved beyond Khrushchev’s idea of a Soviet culture to the even more inclusive idea of a 
Soviet ethnic group. In fact, “one of the explicit goals formulated in the Brezhnev era was 
the establishment of a Soviet people (sovetskii narod) as emblematic of the development 
and fusion of the various nationalities into a supra-nationality.”43 That is, Brezhnev and 
his comrades in the Party leadership wanted to create a new ethnicity out of whole cloth 
to unite the peoples of Soviet Union in a way that Marxism and Communism had so far 
been unable to do. However, Brezhnev’s goals cannot be seen as new or innovative: 
Brezhnev’s Soviet nationality theory contains few original elements, being 
essentially a combination of Khrushchev’s and Stalin's ideas. This 
combination, however, [had] produced a new, and much more solid, 
theoretical scaffolding in support of the superior position of Russian. At 
the same time, non-Russian languages [had] been theoretically disarmed 
and [were] now totally dependent on largely obsolete Leninist theories.44 
Under Brezhnev, Soviet language policy in practice had arrived at a point 
completely at odds with the ideas espoused by Lenin. Nevertheless, the Brezhnev policy 
still comported with the long-held Russian view that language equals ethnicity (and by 
extension identity). Therefore, if all the peoples of the Soviet Union could be united 
under the same language, they all would become a single, united—and newly created—
ethnicity. 
To this end, Brezhnev continued to supplant native language instruction in non-
Russian schools with Russian instruction, and he increased the number of institutions for 
which Russian was the only acceptable language of communication. Under Brezhnev, the 
Party had strayed so far from Lenin's original anti-Russian chauvinism position that now 
the native populations were expected to be bilingual in order to integrate with the Russian 
Soviet infrastructure, as opposed to Lenin’s intention that Russians would be “bilingual if 
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living in a non-Russian area.”45 However, the most telling blow to the status of national 
languages among the Republics was a change to the Soviet Constitution in 1977, which 
abrogated the right to use one’s mother tongue and receive instruction in one’s native 
language, replacing the “right” with the “opportunity.”   Thus, “the 1977 Constitution, 
guarante[ed] only the possibility of access,” not the right (even if the right was only 
notional), to the protection of one’s native tongue. This change was followed in 1978 by 
a decree entitled, “On Measures for Further Improving the Study and Teaching of the 
Russian Language in the Union Republics,” which, among other things, “mandated 
concrete, extensive measures for improving Russian-language teaching.”46 The 1978 
decree was so pervasive that it even instituted Russian instruction at the pre-school level 
in an attempt to increase its proliferation.47 
Despite these significant changes in Soviet policy, there was resistance to the 
perceived Russification of the Soviet Republics. This was especially visible in the 
Transcaucasus region, as evidenced by the battle over naming Georgian as the “state 
language” in the 1976 draft constitution of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. The 
original draft omitted any reference to Georgian as the state language, leading to a 
“language riot before the Government House in Tbilisi…[in 1978], which lasted about 
five hours” and involved up to 50,000 demonstrators. This also came on the heels of a 
Moscow-directed policy to disallow the publication of dissertations for advanced degrees 
at Tbilisi University in any language other than Russian. As a result of the demonstration, 
“the reference to the indigenous language being the ‘state language’ was restored to the 
state constitutions of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidzhan.”48 
F. PERESTROIKA AND BEYOND 
Soviet language policies continued relatively unchanged from the Brezhnev era 
until 1989. In fact, Party leadership paid them little attention, as evidenced by the number 
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of Union Republics that began to assert their language independence from Moscow. By 
1989, Moldova had changed its orthography back to Latin script and all of the Union 
Republics (other than the Russian Republic) had passed laws “granting [their] titular 
languages the status of state language.”  These actions finally provoked a response in 
April 1990, when “the central Soviet government reacted by enacting ‘The law of the 
languages of the peoples of the USSR’ which, for the first time, declared Russian to be 
the state language.”  Grenoble opines, however, “this was more a reaction to what the 
Soviet government viewed as separatist-nationalist tendencies in the individual 
republics,” rather than an attempt at a clear, focused language policy.”49 While 
Grenoble’s assertion does seem to characterize the most practical reasons for designating 
Russian as the state language, it misses a larger underlying point that the choice to enact 
such a law illustrates a broader historical propensity, among those who identify 
themselves as Russian (even during Soviet times), to turn to the “Russianness” of a 
particular issue to find its solution. 
G. CONCLUSION 
It could certainly be argued that almost from the beginning of the Soviet Union, 
even before Lenin’s death, all of the language policies pursued or enacted during its 
history may be seen as a creeping Russian nationalism (often times disguised as devotion 
to Marxism-Leninism or fealty to the Soviet cause) that attempted to co-opt all of the 
other republics in an effort to keep the Soviet Union from dissolving. The final law on 
language policy, enacted in April 1990, was perhaps the death knell to the Soviet Union, 
which had progressed, if one can call it progress, from “all languages are equal” to 
“Russian is the state language.”  The next chapter will discuss how the legacy of identity 
and lingua-centric nationalism have manifested themselves in the Russian Federation and 
the implications that may have for Russia’s future. 
 
49 Grenoble, Language Policy, 63. 
 23
                                                
IV. THE RUSSIAN TODAY? 
A. THE END OF THE SOVIETS 
In his article “The State and Language Policy,” Milton Esman communicates a 
truth that Vladimir Lenin understood well as key to the continued and long-term success 
of the Soviet Union: 
Because language is a distinctive property of most ethnic communities and 
is at the core of ethnic identity and ethnic pride, the relative status of 
language can assume enormous symbolic importance in ethnically divided 
societies. The recognition of one language as “national” or “official” is not 
a mere matter of convenience or of facilitating communication; it 
symbolizes respect for the community it represents…. There are few 
issues, aside from religion, that can mobilize and sustain such passion as 
the status of language because it is central to collective identity.50 
In terms of language and identity, the ideal communist state sought by the 
founders of the Soviet Union was perhaps doomed from the very beginning. Marxist 
ideology held that the proletariat would, of its own volition, come together in a united 
group to overcome nationalism, capitalism, and every other “ill” that plagued the world. 
However, as the Party leadership shepherded the Soviet Union along its path of political 
development, it found coercion a much easer vessel through which to achieve its ends 
than persuasion. Yarolsav Bilinsky was prophetic in 1981, when he stated, “The 
Brezhnev regime sees in the Russian language and culture a cement for the multinational, 
multilingual Soviet Empire. In the long run, however, forcible Russification may turn out 
to be…the acid that will dissolve the ties that have bound the hundred-odd nationalities 
together since 1917.”51 
In the final analysis, it is difficult to say why Soviet leaders embarked on the 
eventually self-destructive course of attempting to assimilate by force the great number of 
nationalities and languages present in the Soviet Union. Perhaps it was because of a 
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latent, or even overt, Russian nationalism that permeated the Soviet leadership, or 
because the sizeable Russian portion of the Soviet population continued to make fewer 
and fewer distinctions between its own Russian heritage and its identification as citizens 
of the Soviet Union; or perhaps it was simply easier to coerce than to persuade. The irony 
of it all, however, is that much of the assimilation desired by the Soviet elite would have 
most likely happened if it would have been allowed to happen voluntarily; but in the end, 
Russian language and culture eventually became the divisive force that Lenin had warned 
against in the beginning. Political leaders in the Russian Federation face a similar 
predicament within the borders of their new county with its old and rich history:  how do 
they assimilate and not alienate the vast numbers of people in the federation who do not 
consider themselves to be “ethnic Russians?” 
B. THE NEW RUSSIAN STATE 
Commenting on the downfall of the Soviet Union, William Safran notes that with 
its collapse, “Soviet language policy has become largely irrelevant.”52 Not only is this a 
rather obvious statement, it also fails to recognize that even though the Soviet Union 
dissolved, many of the problems left to its successor state did not disappear along with it, 
language issues included. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, most of those people 
living in what is now the Russian Federation identified themselves as Soviet citizens—
their citizenship in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was 
secondary or ancillary. This was different from the other republics, where, for example, 
Georgians or Latvians or Moldovans saw themselves as Georgians and Latvians and 
Moldovans first and Soviet Citizens second. This lack of individual identification in the 
Russian republic was not accidental. As John Dunlop points out, “This identification [as 
Soviet versus Russian] had been reinforced structurally: unlike the other fourteen union 
republics. The RSFSR…had deliberately not been given many of the institutions enjoyed 
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Academy of Sciences, as well as no television channels or radio stations tailored 
specifically to the interests of ethnic Russians.53 In a sense, ethnic Russians had lost, or at 
least misplaced, their Russianness. 
The newly formed Russian Federation quickly recovered, however. In addition, 
the dynamics and demographics had changed as well. During Soviet times, ethnic 
Russians made up a small majority of the citizens of the entire Soviet Union and each 
ethnic group, including Russian, was generally concentrated in a specific geographic 
area. In the Russian Federation (at the time of its formation), by contrast, ethnic Russians 
made up approximately 80 percent of the population and constituted a majority in all but 
5 of the Federation’s 21 ethnic Republics. Furthermore, ethnic Russians “have no single 
region that they dominate but are instead divided into 57 provinces that coexist with the 
32 regions designated as ethnic minority homelands as of mid-2004.”54    
Nevertheless, the new makeup did not dissuade lawmakers from codifying 
protections for those within the Russian Federation territory whose native language was 
other than Russian. Those responsible for forming language policy in the Russian 
Federation seem to have learned both from their more recent Soviet predecessors in 
understanding the power of a single unifying language and from Lenin’s ideas regarding 
the protection of indigenous languages. For example, Article 68 of the Russian 
Federation Constitution states that Russian shall be the state language of the Russian 
Federation; however, the republics that are a part of the Federation have a right to 
establish their own state languages, which may be used by public authorities alongside 
the state language of the Russian Federation. In addition, all peoples of the Russian 
Federation are guaranteed the right to maintain their native language and conditions for 
its study and development.55 Furthermore, in 1992, the Russian Federation essentially 
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adopted wholesale the final law on language passed in the Soviet Union shortly before its 
collapse, titled “On the languages of peoples of the RSFSR.”  The 1992 law, and changes 
made later in 1998, did little to alter the substance of the Soviet law; instead changes 
were made to strike references to the RSFSR and to bring the wording of the law in line 
with the language of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.56 The 1992 law stated, 
among other things, that “the languages of the Russian Federation peoples shall be under 
the shelter of the state” and that “the state shall promote the development of national 
languages, bilingualism, and multilingualism inside the Russian Federation territory.”57   
The wording in the Constitution and the adoption of the 1992 law established, 
from the outset, a legally mandated common language that would serve as a lingua franca 
across the Federation, while also guaranteeing that indigenous languages would have the 
protection and patronage of the federal government. The establishment of Russian as 
lingua franca would not happen over time (as during the Soviet era) by the encroachment 
of a set of policies and laws whose surreptitious goals were to crowd out indigenous 
languages. Rather, the position occupied by the Russian language was articulated clearly 
and unambiguously from the very beginning. Perhaps one reason this has so far met with 
little opposition is that the Soviets were effective enough at Russification within the 
RSFSR that the continuation of Russian as a lingua franca was of no particular threat and 
the minority populations genuinely welcomed a renewed opportunity to recultivate their 
native tongues. The acceptance of Russian as a state language and lingua franca may 
have also been facilitated by the attempt of many Russian Federation leaders to identify 
its citizens in civic as opposed to ethnic terms; i.e., rossiianin instead of russkii. 
The most recent law to affect language policy, titled “On the State Language of 
the Russian Federation,” passed in 2005, has done little to change the practical 
relationship between the state and the minority languages; however, it has fortified the 
position of Russian as the language of the Federation. Among other things, the law 
ensures the use of Russian as the state language throughout the territory of the Federation 
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and defines spheres of its obligatory usage. While the law still allows and protects the use 
of other national languages set forth in the constitutions of the individual republics, it 
requires that they be used alongside Russian in the above referenced obligatory contexts 
and mandates that the content in both languages for any given communication must be 
identical. 
C. ROSSIIANE VERSUS RUSSKIE 
Finally, I turn to the problem of distinguishing between ethnic Russians (russkie) 
and Russian Federation citizens (rossiiane) in general. In the Russian Federation, there 
seems to be an evolving dualistic approach to the “identity question.” In some respects, 
political leaders have linked identity with language, as seen in both the “protections” 
given to minority languages and the “prominence” afforded Russian. Nevertheless, 
singling out or protecting ethnolinguistic identities with regard to language laws is 
contrasted by the conspicuous lack of any reference to ethnic definitions or linguistic 
requirements for Russian Federation citizenship in the law adopted on November 28, 
1991. This law refers to Russian citizens in strictly civic terms, i.e., rossiiane.58 
Defining citizens in purely civic terms is certainly a laudable attempt to bring all 
within Russia’s borders under one common umbrella, but the “commitment towards 
encouraging a civic identity among citizens of the [Russian Federation is] not shared by 
the communist and nationalist opposition.”  The opposition groups are certainly not 
unified in their attempts to define Russian identity, but they all have at their core a 
common element—language.59 Those who hope to create a civic identity for all Russian 
Federation citizens also face opposition from the non-Russian autonomies, whose leaders 
argue, “that the notion of a civic nation amounts to imperialist russification in 
disguise.”60 This sentiment is further voiced by non-Russian groups, as noted by Paul 
Goble in his September 25, 2009, “Window on Eurasia” Weblog entry, when the pro-
Kremlin youth organization Nashi “announced plans to hold a ‘Russian March’ on 
 
58 Vera Tolz. “Politicians’ Conceptions of the Russian Nation,” in Contemporary Russian Politics: A 
Reader, ed. Archie Brown (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 355–356. 
59 Tolz, “Politicians’ Conceptions of the Russian Nation,” 359. 
60 Ibid., 362. 
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November 4 [2009] in order to put a different ideological face on Russian nationalism 
than that which xenophobic groups…have given such events in past years.”  According to 
Goble, Nashi members intended to march in support of defining all Russian Federation 
citizens as russkie. He quotes one Nashi leader as saying, “We want to take away this 
name [russkii] from the nationalists because for them a[n ethnic] Russian is someone who 
had eyes and nose of a definite shape. For us, [ethnic] Russians are all those who have 
citizenship in the Russian Federation.”61 Those groups who identify themselves as not 
ethnically Russian, but at the same time citizens of the Russian Federation, will most 
certainly balk at any efforts they perceive as attempts by the majority ethnic Russian 
population to further Russify them. 
This youth demonstration serves as a microcosm for the larger “identity issue” 
that confronts Russian leaders. As Russia’s political leaders struggle to define what 
exactly a Russian citizen is and how to properly refer to him or her, the nature and status 
of the majority and minority language populations will most certainly hold a prominent 
position in the national discussion. Perhaps this is because, as an international relations 
instructor at Saint Petersburg University suggests, Russians (whether they be russkie or 
rossiiane) have yet to define for themselves what exactly it means to be a citizen of the 
Russian Federation and more specifically, what are the “universal markers of 
Russianness.”62 Until all citizens of the Russian Federation can agree what it is to be 
Russian in the civic as opposed to the ethnic sense, “language as an instrument for 
change” will continue to be “more preoccupied with national rather than civic identity,” 
and this will remain a Moscow’s Achilles’ heel for a long time to come.63 
D. CONCLUSION 
Russian history, from Kievan Rus’ to the current Russian Federation, is nothing if 
not the chronicle of a group of peoples struggling for an identity. Even today, leaders of 
 
61 Andrei Kozenko, “Marsh Nashionalistov,” Kommersant, September 29, 2009, 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1242556. 
62 Dmitry Lanko, “Sootechestvenniki kak natsional’nyi mif,” Neva 8 (2009), 
http://magazines.russ.ru/neva/2009/8/loa8.html.  
63 Michael S. Gorham, “Natsiia ili snikerizatsiia? Identity and Perversion in the Language Debates of 
Late-and Post-Soviet Russia,” Russian Review 59 (2000): 619. 
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the Russian Federation strive to perpetuate the Russian Diaspora and protect the 
“Russian” populations of former Soviet Republics, especially in places such as the 
Baltics, Ukraine, and Moldova. While it may seem that the Russian leadership is acting in 
a schizophrenic manner by trying to downplay ethnic distinctions within its own boarders 
in favor of civic ones while attempting to magnifying the ethnic identity of russkie in its 
near abroad, in reality, it is the Kremlin continuing the Soviet policy of using language as  
a tool to homogenize those who are near the seat of power and exert pressure and 
influence in places that are removed from it. 
Studying the way Russian leaders approach language, language policy, and ethnic 
and national identity is not only important, it is necessary because it gives us unique 
insight into the Russian political system. It is outside the scope of this thesis, but future 
research that investigates how the different political groups in Russia—whether 
nationalist or globalist, Slavophile or Westernizer, Eurasianist or Europeanist—use 
language and its status to achieve their own ends, could yield significant dividends in 
comprehending the Russian political system, the Russian psyche, and in the end provide a 
clearer picture of Russian identity. As with any endeavor, international relations included, 
the more complete one’s understanding of the issues and individuals involved, the more 
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